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c Sv'W v Z+Wv2j c Z+Wv2 /V v Ovt )Sv) U.+/mote[s] the
A+/T+W** /V >[RW0[Wj=1 The law ensures a fair, just, and
efficient return to those who author and distribute works of
authorship, and by doing so, guarantees that those who enjoy
such works will have a wide and varied supply at a
reasonable price. I call that dream copyright. In a 2001
article, The Death of Copyright, I feared my dream had
died.2 In the opening two sentences of that article, I
proclaimed:
Copyright is dead. The Digital Millennium
!/.q+RTS) #[) oU{^!#=n Sv* PROOWZ R)j3
As I explained, I was not worried that copyright, as a
law, as a set of exclusive rights, had died, but that
U[/.q+RTS)= v* v Ovt )Sv) *W+'WZ v .(uOR[l +v)SW+ )Sv0 v
private, purpose had died. As it turns out, I was worried
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology,
Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L.
REV. 813 (2001).
3
Id. at 814.
2
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about the wrong thing. Copyright is dead. But it was not the
DMCA that killed it. It has become increasingly clear to me
that copyright, as a law that serves the public interest, was
only ever a dream. In the real world, it never existed at all.
In my dream, copyright is built on a simple premise:
more copyright yields more money for copyright owners,
and more money in turn means more and better creative
work. In my dream, rent-seeking is part of copyright; to
fulfill its purpose, copyright generates rents (or incentives, if
you prefer) for copyright owners. But it does so only to the
extent that those rents are necessary and inextricably tied to
ensuring more and better creative works. At the time my
Death of Copyright article was published in 2001, file
sharing had only just gotten started. With Napster opening
its virtual doors in the summer of 1999, sales revenue had
begun to fall for the recording industry. 4 But by 2001, the
fall had just begun. How far revenue would fall or what
effect that might have on creative output we could not yet
determine.
The lack of evidence did not stop the copyright
industries from proclaiming that the sky was falling. 5 In
their view, if file sharing was not stopped, no one would pay
4

As I discuss elsewhere, the Recording Industry Association of America
reports that sales of recorded music in the United States in constant dollar
terms peaked in 1999. See GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT9S EXCESS:
MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE US RECORDING INDUSTRY 75, 81 (2018).
5
Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005) (No. 04-480), at *4Y5 (UIn the 1980s, it was the Betamax and the
home taping of television broadcasts; today, it is P2P file sharing and
musical works. But the ;sky is falling9 rhetoric remains the same.=); see
also Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125, 125 (2011) (UAre the content
industries doomed? They certainly seem to think so. The music industry
tells us, as their revenues decline because of file sharing, ;we can9t
compete with free,9 and so we9re history. No one is going to create new
music anymore.=).
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for music.6 And if no one would pay for music, no one
would create or distribute music, at least not good music. In
my 2001 article, I questioned this reasoning. While other
scholars writing at the time largely accepted it,7 I was not so
sure. First, I did not believe that just because music
consumers could free-ride that they inevitably would. 8 Their
own self-interest would lead, at least some, and perhaps
enough, consumers to pay for the music they wanted.
Second, I did not believe that the loss in revenue would
impact marginal artists as strongly as it impacted superstars.9
Because superstar earnings far exceeded their reservation
cost, I posited that revenue could fall sharply without
reducing creative output at the margins. Third, I argued that
reducing income for the superstars might even increase
creative output.10 #* c Wr.OvR0WZ R0 )SW v+)R[OWC U6SROW
copyright simplistically assumes that more incentive means
more productivity, this assumption is flawed. At some point,
SRTSW+ +W)(+0* V/+ v TR'W0 v()S/+9* t/+P tROO ORPWOq +WZ([W
)Sv) v()S/+9* [+Wv)R'W /().()j=11
While this might seem counterintuitive, it reflects a
well-established principle in labor economics known as the
backward-bending labor supply curve. 12 When wages are
low, a slight increase in pay will lead most individuals to
work longer hours in order to capture the greater income the
R0[+Wv*WZ tvTW 2vPW* v'vROvuOW o)SW U*(u*)R)()R/0= WVVW[)nj
6

This fear is not new. It has been proffered as an excuse for copyright
since at least 1586. See Lunney, supra note 4, at 11 (quoting Stationer
Guild9s Petition to the Star Chamber).
7
See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY,
LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (Stanford Univ. Press 2007);
Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peerto-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
8
See Lunney, supra note 2, at 858Y68.
9
See id. at 882Y87.
10
Id. at 890Y92.
11
Id. at 890.
12
Id. at 890Y92.
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But as wages continue to increase, eventually they reach a
point where the individuals begin to have enough money to
*.W0Z /0 )SW )SR0T* )SWq tv0) o)SW UR0[/2W= WVVW[)nj B0W /V
the things individuals want is leisure Y spending time on the
activities an individual most enjoys. Once wages have
increased to the inflection point, individuals are earning
enough that they want to buy more leisure rather than work.
As a result, the income effect begins to outweigh the
substitution effect, and the labor supply curve starts to bend
backward. Beyond that point, further wage increases will
lead the individual to work less, rather than more. In the late
1990s, copyrRTS) W0*(+WZ v0 WVVW[)R'W UtvTW= V/+ /(+ )/.
artists and authors far in excess of their reservation price, and
potentially above the point at which the labor supply curve
began to bend backward. Thus, I argued that reducing
revenue might actually lead some superstar artists to work
more, rather than less.
While I did not have the evidence necessary to test
these propositions empirically, I offered reasoning and
anecdotes to support each.13 Today, we have lived with the
reality of file sharing for nearly twenty years. Even so, we
*)ROO Z/ 0/) Sv'W W'RZW0[W )/ )W*) [/.q+RTS)9* V(0Zv2W0)vO
premise or file-*Sv+R0T9* R2.v[) v[+/** )SW V(OO +v0TW /V
creative products that copyright protects. However, we do
have evidence to test them for the sound recording industry
Y the industry where file sharing has had the greatest impact.
In a newly-published book, COPYRIGHT9S EXCESS: MONEY
AND MUSIC IN THE US RECORDING INDUSTRY,14 I present and
Wrv2R0W )Sv) W'RZW0[Wj ?v)SW+ )Sv0 *(../+) [/.q+RTS)9*
fundamental premise, it finds exactly the opposite
relationship between money and music output. For the
United States recording industry over the last fifty years,
increased revenue was associated with fewer and lower
13
14

Id. at 858Y92.
LUNNEY, supra note 4.
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quality hit songs, ceteris paribus.15 Decreased revenue was
associated with more and better-quality hit songs, ceteris
paribus.16
For me, this finding raises serious concerns
regarding copyright. We tell ourselves that copyright
enriches copyright owners, but only to ensure a vibrant and
varied supply of creative works.17 In this story, the public
interest is paramount; the additional rents for copyright
owners are only incidental. In rare moments of candor or
doubt, we may acknowledge, in our minds if nowhere else,
that the weight of these two interests may, in fact, be
reversed. In the real world, the rents may, in truth, be
[/.q+RTS)9* raison d’etre; the additional creative works only
incidental. We might also worry that overbroad copyright
chills follow-on creativity. In our worst moments, we might
even fear that copyright was in truth pure rent-seeking,
generating rents for copyright owners without increasing
creative output at all.

15

Id. at 192 (U[T]he net effect of maximizing copyright in order to
maximize revenue has been, at least for the popular music industry in the
United States, to reduce creative output.=).
16
Id.
17
See U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (UThe
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration.=); see also Feist Publ9ns v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (UThe primary objective of copyright is
not to reward the labor of authors, but ;[tlo promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.=; (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8));
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(UThe immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an ;author9s9 creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.=); Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (UThe economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
;Science and useful Arts.= (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
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However, as it turns out, our fears regarding
copyright fell far short of the truth. In the music industry
over the last fifty years, broad and strong copyright
protection has proven worse than pure rent-seeking.18 Sure,
copyright generated market power, the resulting rents, and
associated rent-seeking and monopoly harms. But, more
critically, it also reduced creative authorship. Moreover, it
reduced authorship not in some incidental manner by
occasionally chilling follow-on authorship. Rather, it
reduced authorship directly and perversely by increasing the
economic returns on authorship for our superstar artists so
much that it led them to work less.19
And so, the copyright of my dreams is dead. It may
in fact never have existed. At least for the recording industry
in the United States over the last fifty years, strong and
WVVW[)R'W [/.q+RTS) .+/)W[)R/0 ZRZ 0/) U.+/2/)W )SW A+/gress
/V >[RW0[Wj= c) ZRZ 0/) R0[+Wv*W [+Wv)R'W /().() /+ 2vPW
music more widely available. It reduced both the quantity
and quality of music created; and for the music that was
created, copyright limited its availability. 20 It is time to stop
pretending otherwise.
In this essay, I will present a brief summary of some
of that evidence.21 Section I presents a history of the sound
recording copyright, from its creation in 1971 through its
UZW*)+([)R/0= uWTR00R0T R0 LDDD tR)S )SW +R*W /V VROW *Sv+R0Tj
Consi*)W0) tR)S )SW U2/+W [/.q+RTS) W,(vO* 2/+W 2/0Wq=
v*.W[) /V [/.q+RTS)9* V(0Zv2W0)vO .+W2R*Wl tW VR0Z v
somewhat parallel rise and fall in revenue from the sales of
recorded music. Section II then presents one measure of
music output and shows that both the quantity and quality of
music output fell during the 1990s when sales of recorded
18

LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 192, 194.
Id.
20
Id.
21
For a more complete version of the evidence, see LUNNEY, supra note
4.
19
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music reached their peak. Section III explains why music
output fell as revenues rose and then rose as revenues fell.
Section IV concludes.
I.

THE RISE AND “"ALL” OF THE SOUND RECORDING
COPYRIGHT

At the behest of the recording industry, Congress
created a sound recording right in 1971.22 The new
[/.q+RTS) .+/)W[)WZ */(0Z +W[/+ZR0T* 2vZW /+ UVRrWZ= vV)W+
February 15, 1972. Compared to the usual panoply of rights
copyright provides, Congress limited the sound recording
copyright in two respects. First, the reproduction and
derivative work rights were limited to exact, mechanical
duplication of the sounds recorded.23 Someone else may recreate the same song or sounds exactly; they simply may not
do so by mechanically copying the original recording. 24
Thus, if an artist wants to include a bass riff in a later song,
)SW v+)R*) tROO R0V+R0TW )SW Wv+ORW+ t/+P9* */(0Z +W[/+ZR0T
copyright if she samples the riff from a copyrighted sound
recording. She will not, however, infringe if she re-creates
the bass riff by playing it herself.
Second, when Congress originally enacted the sound
recording copyright, it included no public performance right.
In contrast, the copyright in the composition of a song, the
so-called musical work copyright, had prohibited the
unauthorized public performance right of the musical work
22

The Sound Recording Copyright Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391, 392 (1971).
23
17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012) (limiting the scope of the sound recording
copyright to later works that Urecapture the actual sounds fixed in the
recording=).
24
See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792,
800 (6th Cir. 2005) (UThis means that the world at large is free to imitate
or simulate the creative work fixed in the recording so long as an actual
copy of the sound recording itself is not made.=).

Volume 59 – Number 1

200 IDEA – eTh
Law

Re

i v we

f o et h

klanFr

in i P c r e

Ce tn e r

rf o

I n t e l e t c al u

po rP

t yr e

since 1897.25 As a result, even after Congress created the
sound recording copyright in 1971, to play a song on the
radio, a radio station had to obtain and pay for a public
performance license to the musical work copyright owner,
but not to the sound recording copyright owner. In 1995,
Congress gave sound recording copyright owners a public
performance right, but it extended only to publicly
.W+V/+2R0T v */(0Z +W[/+ZR0T Uuq 2Wv0* /V v ZRTR)vO v(ZR/
)+v0*2R**R/0j=26 From the outset, the sound recording digital
public performance right was not a full-fledged public
performance right, but much more limited. For example,
Congress expressly excluded nonsubscription radio and
television broadcasts from its reach altogether.27 The sound
recording digital public performance right did reach certain
subscription transmissions, as well as interactive and
noninteractive digital transmissions over the Internet. 28
While these were not particularly significant sources of
licensing revenue in 1995, in the last few years, they have
become more significant with the rise of Internet music
services, such as Spotify.
With the creation and rise of the sound recording
right, revenue from sales and licensing of recorded music

25

Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481, 481Y82.
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub.L.
No. 39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 106(6)
and 114(d)).
27
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (excluding nonsubscription
broadcast transmissions from the reach of the sound recording
copyright9s digital public performance right); see also Bonneville Int9l
Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003) (UThe paradigmatic
;nonsubscription broadcast transmission9 was a traditional over-the-air
radio broadcast.=).
28
LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 66Y67.
26
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also rose. Figure 1 tracks the rise of that revenue from 1961
)/ R)* .WvP R0 LDDD R0 [/0*)v0) KhLJ Z/OOv+* oU3KhLJ=nj29
$25,000.0
$20,000.0
$15,000.0
$10,000.0
$5,000.0
$0.0
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Figure 1. Music Sales (All Formats) in the United
States (Constant 2013 Dollars, in Millions): 19611999.30

As Figure 1 reflects, sales of recorded music rose
more or less steadily from 1961 through 1999. From under
$4 billion ($2013) in 1961, sales rose to an initial peak in
1978 of just over $15 billion ($2013), and then fell back with
second OPEC oil embargo and associated recessions until
1983. After 1983, sales resumed a steady upward trend until
they reached record levels and peaked at just over $20.7
billion ($2013) in 1999.
29

LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 68. From 1972 on, the data is from the
Recording Industry Association of America9s database. From 1961
through 1971, I obtained the sales data from Billboard Magazine.
30
For the years 1973 and thereafter, the data for Figure 1 comes from the
Recording Industry Association of America9s shipment database
(available at RIAA, www.riaa.com). For the years 1972 and before, the
data comes from specific issues of Billboard magazine and is adjusted to
constant dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics9 CPI calculator.
LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 67 n.34.
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After Napster opened its virtual doors in 1999, this
more-or-less steady upward progression in sales revenue
came to an abrupt end. Although copyright owners pursued
a relentless litigation campaign against file sharing services,
and when that failed, against individual file sharers,31 their
successes in the courtroom did not put the file-sharing genie
back into the bottle. To the contrary, Cisco estimates that
file sharing traffic in North America has grown more-or-less
steadily.32 For 2016, Cisco estimated that file sharing traffic
in North America exceeded one thousand petabytes per
month.33 That is roughly 250 million DVDs or 1.25 billion
CD-quality albums a month.
As file sharing traffic increased, revenue from the
sales of recorded music in the United States decreased.
Figure 2 tracks the fall of that revenue from 1999 through
2014, again in constant 2013 dollars.

31

See LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 70Y72.
CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND
METHODOLOGY, 2011-2018, at 11 (2014); CISCO, CISCO VISUAL
NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY, 2007-2012, at 4
(2008).
33
CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND
METHODOLOGY, 2011-2018, at 11 (2014).
32
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Figure 2. Post-Napster Music Sales (All Formats) in
the United States (Constant 2013 Dollars, in Millions):
1999-2014.34

As Figure 2 reflects, there has been a steady decline
in shipments of recorded music since the advent of file
sharing in 1999. From its peak of $20.7 billion ($2013) in
1999, revenue from sales of recorded music have fallen in
the United States to a low of just under $7.0 billion ($2013)
in 2014. That is a decline in annual sales of $13.7 billion
($2013), or 66.4 percent.
While most of the legal and academic scholarship has
focused on the extent to which file sharing is or is not
responsible for this fall in revenue, that question does not
interest me. In my view, the more interesting question, and
the one that I raised in The Death of Copyright and attempted
to answer in COPYRIGHT9S EXCESS, is how did that rise and
VvOO vVVW[) 2(*R[ /().()j cV )SW U2/+W 2/0Wq 2Wv0* 2/+W
v0Z uW))W+ 2(*R[= v*.W[) /V [/.q+RTS)9* V(0Zv2W0)vO .+W2R*W
is correct, then the quality and quantity of music released
should have started low in the 1960s and risen to a peak in
34

The data in Figure 2 comes from the RIAA9s shipment database
(available at RIAA, www.riaa.com).
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the 1990s, as revenues peaked. As revenues fell after 1999,
the quality and quantity of music released should also have
fallen.
This should not be a subtle or difficult test for
[/.q+RTS)9* V(0damental premise to pass. While it is a
natural experiment and bears the associated weaknesses,
revenue in constant dollar terms increased by more than four
hundred percent from 1961 to 1999. 35 It then fell by nearly
two-thirds from 1999 to 2014. These are very large changes
R0 +W'W0(Wj cV )SW+W R* v0q )+()S R0 [/.q+RTS)9* U2/+W 2/0Wql
2/+W 2(*R[= .+W2R*Wl )SW0 tW *S/(OZ *WW v .v+vOOWO +R*W v0Z
fall in music output. Moreover, given the size of the revenue
changes, the parallel rise and fall in music output should be
immediately and readily apparent to us all.
II.

MEASURING MUSIC OUTPUT

In COPYRIGHT9S EXCESS, I looked at four measures
of music output.36 \/0W /V )SW2 *(../+)WZ [/.q+RTS)9*
fundamental premise that more money generated more or
better music. To the contrary, the data found the exact
opposite correlation: more money meant less and worse
music. In this essay, I will present only one of those
measures: the most popular 1,001 songs streamed on Spotify
in 2014 world-wide that first appeared on the Billboard Hot
100 chart before 2006.
The Spotify data represents a direct measure of the
satisfaction Spotify consumers derived in 2014 from

35

See LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 119Y20.
Id. at 84Y156. The four measures include: (i) a simple count of albums
released each year; (ii) Rolling Stone magazine9s list of the top 500
albums of all time; (iii) data drawn from the Billboard Hot 100 weekly
chart; and (iv) Spotify9s list of the top 1,001 songs streamed worldwide
in 2014 that appeared on the Hot 100 chart before 2006. Id.
36
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listening to music. 37 When I speak of more and better music,
this is what I mean Y music that consumers want to listen to.
eR'W0 v [S/R[W /V v0q */0T R0 >./)RVq9* KH 2ROOR/0 */0T
catalog, these are the songs that consumers choose to listen
to.
Spotify released the artist, title, and year of release
for each of the top 1,001 songs and also released the number
of times each song was streamed in 2014.38 In COPYRIGHT9S
EXCESS, I used this data to create three measures of music
output: (i) the number of songs in the top 1,001 from each
year from 1962-2005; (ii) the number of total streams from
the songs in the top 1,001 from each year from 1962-2005;
and (iii) the average number of streams from the songs in the
top 1,001 from each year from 1962-2005.39 Although all
three measures show the same trend, in this essay, I will
discuss only the total streams data.
Figure 3 presents the total streams from the songs in
the Spotify top 1,001 for each year from 1960-2005.

37
Matt Daniels, The Most Timeless Songs of All Time: Using Spotify to
Measure the Popularity of Older Songs, THE PUDDING,
https://pudding.cool/2017/03/timeless/index.html.
38
Id.
39
Id.
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Figure 3. Music Output: Total Streams for Spotify
Top 1001 by Year of Release.

Figure 3 reveals two immediate points. First, the
total stream count does not rise and fall with sales revenue.
There is no peak in the late 1970s, followed by a decline in
the early 1980s. Similarly, there is no peak in the 1990s,
followed by a decline through the post-Napster file sharing
2000s. Even without any further analysis, the Spotify data
rejects the notion that more revenue led to more and better
music.
Second, there is a definite time trend, or perhaps two
time trends, in the data. From 1962 through 1997, there is a
fairly steady increase in total streams each year. This may
reflect that consumers have a preference for more recent
music, or it may reflect that the age distribution of Spotify
consumers skews to younger consumers. In any case, the
preference for newer music accelerates beginning in 1998.
That new stronger time trend then continues through the end
of the available data in 2005.
We can use statistical techniques to take this time
trend out of the data. For example, we can estimate expected
total streams for each year by regressing the actual total
59 IDEA 193 (2018)
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streams against year and year-squared. We can then subtract
the actual total streams from the estimated total streams to
get a normalized total stream count. This normalized count
provides a measure of the popularity of the songs in the top
1,001 from each year, adjusted for the age of the music.
Figure 4 presents this normalized or age-adjusted total
stream count.
250000000
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-500000001950
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Figure 4. Music Output: Age-Adjusted Total Streams
for Spotify Top 1001 by Year of Release.

As Figure 4 illustrates, on an age-adjusted basis,
there is no preference among Spotify consumers in 2014 for
music from the high revenue 1990s. To the contrary, of all
the decades, the high-revenue 1990s performed the worst.
The 90s are the music to which Spotify consumers in 2014
disproportionately did not want to listen, on an age-adjusted
basis. In contrast, the best years for music in Figure 4 are
1983 and 2005, both low revenue years. 40

40

While the low revenue early 1960s do not fare well in Figure 4, we
should keep in mind that songs by the Beatles were not available on
Spotify in 2014. LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 122Y56.
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In COPYRIGHT9S EXCESS, I go beyond the visual
appearance of Figure 4 and use a variety of regression
)W[S0R,(W* )/ )+q v0Z VR0Z [/.q+RTS)9* *(../*WZ [/++WOv)R/0
between money and music output.41 As part of this search, I
examine changes in music technology, both for creating and
distributing music. I examine changes in demographics,
particularly the size of the age 15-19 population cohort. I
examine changes in the economy generally. I examine not
just the total stream Spotify data, but all three Spotify
measures, as well as three other measures of music output.
In the end, the conclusion I reach is both consistent across
these measures and striking: There is no evidence that more
money meant more or better music. To the contrary, when I
found a statistically significant correlation, I found that more
money meant fewer and lower quality hit songs. 42 The
question became why Y why did more money mean less
music?
III.

WHY MORE MONEY MEANT LESS MUSIC

#* R) )(+0* /()l c tv* +RTS) vOO vO/0Tj !/.q+RTS)9*
simplistic assumption that more money means more music
is wrong. As I explained in 2001, in the copyright industries,
the backward-bending labor supply curve is real. 43 As everbroader copyright continues to increase the economic return
for authorship, particularly for our superstar artists and
authors, at some point, those economic returns become so
high that they push our superstars onto the backwardbending portion of the labor supply curve. When that
happens, our superstar artists and authors began to work less.
41

See id.
Id. at 156.
43
See Lunney, supra note 2, at 890 (UWhile copyright simplistically
assumes that more incentive means more productivity, this assumption
is flawed. At some point, higher returns for a given author9s work will
likely reduce that author9s creative output.=).
42
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This problem is particularly acute in the copyright
industries because many markets for copyrighted works are,
if not winner take all, winner take most. In such a market,
using a uniform set of legal rights, such as copyright, to
encourage production at the margins is an ineffective and
poorly designed mechanism. Instead of incentives going to
the marginal work, and thereby ensuring its expected
profitability and hence production, most of the incentives go
to the non-marginal work.44 Giving additional incentives to
a non-marginal work yields no social benefit. It is, at best,
simply a waste.
We can get some sense for the size of this waste
using the Spotify top 1,001 data. If instead of grouping the
songs by year, we simply rank the top 1,001 Spotify songs
by their total stream count, Figure 5 is the result.
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Figure 5. Spotify World-Wide Streams in 2014: Top
1001 Hot 100 Songs, 1958-2005.

44

A non-marginal work is one that would already be profitable, and
hence produced, even in the absence of copyright, or with a narrower or
shorter copyright. See LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 5, 6.
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As Figure 5 illustrates, the distribution of streams,
even within this select group, is highly skewed. 45 Spotify
consumers streamed the top song in this group, Lose
Yourself, by Eminem, nearly sixty million times in 2014. In
contrast, they streamed the last song on the list, Name by the
Goo Goo Dolls, only 4.6 million times in 2014.
If Name is the marginal work, trying to increase its
earnings through a uniform set of rights is a costly,
inefficient, and essentially futile approach. If we create or
broaden a uniform set of legal rights, such as the sound
recording copyright, in order to increase the earnings for the
marginal song, then we would also increase, proportionally,
the earnings of the more popular, but non-marginal songs.46
Given the distribution of streams in Figure 5, to put one
Z/OOv+ R0 )SW e// e// {/OO*9 Sv0Z* V/+ Name through such a
uniform broadening, we would have to put $2,343.25 in the
hands of the artists of the more popular, but non-marginal
works.47
Even for a government program, $2,343.25 in
misdirected incentives for every dollar in properly directed
45

Id. at 20Y21.
Actually, the earnings for the top works may increase more than
proportionally. With a higher demand, a uniform set of rights may
enable a superstar artist such as Drake, Eminem, or Taylor Swift to
negotiate, for example, with Spotify for a per stream royalty higher than
the royalty for a marginal artist.
47
That number understates the extent to which copyright9s incentives are
misaligned with its public purpose. The average song on Spotify was
streamed only forty times a day, or just under fifteen thousand times a
year. In contrast, the most popular song on Spotify, to date, is One
Dance, by Drake, with featured appearances by Wizkid and Kyla,
streamed a billion times in just 224 days. If we compare one billion
streams for the most popular song to fifteen thousand streams for the
average song, and assume that earnings are proportional to streams, then
to generate one additional dollar in revenue for the average work,
copyright9s uniform set of rights must also generate $66,666.67 in
additional revenue for the most popular, but obviously non-marginal
work.
46
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incentives seems terribly wasteful. However, it is not just
that these misdirected incentives are wasteful, they are
affirmatively harmful to copyrigh)9* .(uOR[ .(+./*Wj <SW*W
misdirected and excess incentives ensure that our most
popular artists are vastly overpaid. By providing these
excess incentives, copyright encourages our superstar artists
to work less. As a result, when revenues were high for the
recording industry, as they were in the 1990s, our top artists
produced fewer studio albums and fewer Hot 100 hits in the
first ten years of their career.48 In contrast, when revenues
were low, both in the 1960s before the sound recording
copyright and in the post-file sharing 2000s, our top artists
produced more studio albums and more Hot 100 hits.49 It is
no coincidence that the most prolific artists in the study, 50
the Beatles and Taylor Swift, had their first Hot 100 hits in
the low revenue years of 1964 and 2006, respectively.
Indeed, of our top twenty, most prolific artists, all but one
began their careers in low revenue eras.51
For the United States recording industry over the last
fifty years, more money has not meant more and better
music. It has meant less. The notion that copyright can serve
the public interest by increasing revenue for copyright
owners has, at least for the recording industry, proven false.
IV.

COPYRIGHT IS DEAD, LONG LIVE COPYRIGHT?

Copyright is dead. The DMCA did not, however, kill
it. Copyright, in the sense of a law intended to promote the
public interest, never existed at all. It was only ever a dream.
48

LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 157Y72.
Id.
50
Among artists who had their first hot 100 hit between 1962 and 2006.
UMost prolific= is based upon the number of Hot 100 hits, as lead artist,
in the first ten calendar years following their first Hot 100 hit. LUNNEY,
supra note 4, at 94Y95, 102Y08, 159Y69.
51
See LUNNEY, supra note 4, at 158Y62 (noting that Jay-Z was tied for
twentieth).
49
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For the recording industry over the last fifty years,
when copyright protection was strong and effective, it forced
consumers to pay more for music. If that increased price
neither increased nor decreased music output, then copyright
was merely an unproductive tax. It simply forced consumers
to pay more for works of authorship that would have existed
in any event, even in the absence of copyright.
As it turned out, however, the sound recording
copyright was far worse than a mere unproductive tax. It
affirmatively reduced creative output.
It generated
economic returns for our most popular superstar artists and
authors far in excess of their reservations costs. By
providing these excess incentives, copyright led our most
important cultural contributors to produce fewer and lower
quality works of authorship. Rather than promote culture, in
the recording industry over the last fifty years, strong and
effective copyright protection diminished our cultural
patrimony.
Copyright is dead. If only copyright would die.

59 IDEA 193 (2018)

